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The Carthaginian Senate

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Organization

The Carthaginian Senate was formally and collectively called "The Mighty Ones" (h’drm or hadirim in the Punic language) by the citizenry. It included an internal, and possibly executive, Council of 30.

The number of the senators was several hundred, possibly around 300, many likely former sufetes and generals.

Hoyos suggests that administrative roles, such as rab, scribe, or market inspector, may have been the path to the senate.

The senate dealt with issues of peace and war, and had the power to involve itself in nearly all aspects of domestic affairs; according to a Roman writer, the senate once banned the citizenry of Carthage from learning Greek, which likely did not last long. Historian Richard Miles suggests that by the early 5th century, the senate may have gained control of the treasury and foreign policy. The senate had an inner sacred council, the Council of Thirty, by the third century, whose authority Livy focuses upon. Its exact authority is unknown, but it may have set the agenda or functioned as an executive committee in its own right. The exact foundation of the Council of Thirty is unknown, but it existed at least by the third century, however, its early history is obscure.

The Carthaginian senate contained unique institutions, such as the "Pentarchies", which Aristotle emphasized the importance of. Aristotle states that these pentarchies were powerful commissions that co-opted their own membership and nominated members of the senate to the Hundred and Four, the high court of the land, based entirely on merit, but by a process unknown. This high court carried the special responsibility of sentencing failed generals to death. While the membership of the Hundred and Four was limited to senators in the fifth century when it was established, according to the Augustan-era historian Pompeius Trogus, by 196 BC it seems that some ex-magistrates would join the ranks automatically. Historian B. D. Hoyos comments that although it is likely that these ex-magistrates were already senators, it would mean that the nominating role of the pentarchies had either been reduced or entirely abolished by this time.

The exact qualification to become a senator are not known, but Aristotle states that noble birth and wealth were essential. He further comments that a person could hold multiple political roles simultaneously, however, there are no examples of this after his time, and it may have become illegal by the time of Hamilcar.

Bribery within the political system of Carthage was a given, and Hoyos states that it existed "on a scale to amaze Greeks and Romans".

Sources state that, if the Carthaginian Senate and the two sufetes were in agreement, the Carthaginian people did not need to be consulted; if they were not in agreement, the matter would have to be put before the people. The sufetes and Senate could also jointly decide that an issue should be decided by the people, rather than themselves. If the sufetes and senate disagreed over the matter of referall, it would be referred to the senate, and presumably, should the sufetes fail to agree with each other, or the bulk of the senate, the matter would be put before the citizenry.

The exact manner in which the senators were chosen is unknown, but they may have been selected by co-option, which would give the Carthaginian citizenry even less say in the composition of the senate than their counterparts in Rome. Senators did not serve for established terms, but remained senators for life. According to historian John Lazenby, the senate, alongside the inner Council of Thirty and the Hundred and Four judges, would suggest that Carthage was ruled over by "an even narrower oligarchy than Rome." Aristotle had remarked on Carthage that it was an aristocratic nation, with tinges of both democracy and oligarchy. The people of Carthage did play some role in decision-making, as according to the primary source Polybius, the decision that Hannibal would lead troops in Iberia was confirmed by the popular assemblies. Historian Howard Hayes Scullard comments that the right to membership within popular assemblies would have been restricted to male citizens of a certain age, and likely a certain level of wealth, but the exact qualifications are unknown. Livy also states that by the time of the Second Punic War, the people held the greatest extent of power that they would possess in the history of Carthage. However, this was still not a large amount, as neither his recounting of the declaration of war nor the acceptance of Scipio's terms makes mention of the people, but only the sufetes and the senate. For comparison, Livy notes the question of war was put forth to the people of Rome. Aristotle does explain that although the citizens had complete power within their assemblies to both debates and put forth their own proposals, the consent of the citizenry was unnecessary if the sufetes and Senate agreed. Scullard comments that it is unlikely that the senate would remit any but the most serious issues to the popular assemblies.

Livy mentions the factionalism of the Carthaginian Senate several times, which Lazenby posits supports the theory that "party politics" were much the same in Carthage as in Rome. Scullar considers it likely that the sufetes and senate would represent the interests of the landowners, while the Hundred and Four and Pentarchies backed the commercial interests. While the commercial interests viewed that Carthage's economic interest might be resolved by way of foreign adventures, the landowners sought to make use of North Africa's enormous capacity to produce agricultural goods.

The task of negotiating with foreign powers was left to generals and admirals, often in the form of diplomatic missions, which might include forming alliances and negotiating peace terms. However, the Historian Louis Rawlings notes that it is known that the senate debated the terms of such agreements, and likely played a part in ratifying them, as much as the senate approved the resupply of armies. On some occasions, the Carthaginians engaged in a form of gunboat diplomacy. In 280, a Mago sailed with 120 ships to offer aid to the Romans against Pyrrhus, which was rejected; Rawlings comments that the affair was a "conspicuous display of military power and willingness to get involved in the defense of Italy."

Role in Carthaginian History

Carthaginian conquest of Iberia

Carthaginian conquest in the Iberian Peninsula before and during 2nd Punic War

According to the historian Appian, when Hamilcar Barca launched an expedition to extend its lands in Iberia, he did so against the desire of the senate. While usually the Carthaginian system controlled their generals by way of controlling the flow of men, money, and supplies to them, and later reviewing their conduct and punishing mistakes. However, Hamilcar never returned to face judgment for his actions but instead relied upon supporters in the senate and popular assemblies, using the vast wealth of Spain to not only reduce state debt but also levy the gold and silver from Iberia to support his political cause. The lands that Hamilcar conquered were made into a quasi-monarchical, autonomous state in southern and eastern Iberia, which he ruled over as viceroy. This conquest gave Carthage the silver mines, agricultural wealth, manpower, military facilities such as shipyards, and territorial depth to stand up to future Roman demands with confidence.

When Hamilcar died in battle in 229, it was de jure the responsibility of the Carthaginian senate to select the replacement, however, this right had been ignored since Carthage had been weakened by the Mercenary War, and was again ignored by the army of Iberia, who acclaimed Hamilcar's son-in-law, Hasdrubal the Fair, as the successor. This acclamation was received with much enthusiasm by the popular assemblies of Carthage, and soon after Hasdrubal returned to Carthage to attempt a coup d'état, and install himself as a monarch. The senate managed to repulse this attack, and Hasdrubal retreated to Iberia and ignored instructions from the senate. This narrative of an attempted overthrowal of the government was denied by Polybius, but Miles considers it likely, given Hasdrubal's history of outright buying support, and following actions, that it is true. Hasbdrubal ruled in Iberia until 221 when he was assassinated by a vengeful servant, but his army quickly acclaimed Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, as his successor, which was ratified by the popular assembly. The appointment of Hannibal confirmed to the Carthaginians that Carthaginian Iberia was a possession of the Barcid family; Livy gives a diatribe supposedly written by Hanno II the Great against Hannibal: "Are we afraid that it will be too long before Hamilcar's son surveys the extravagant power and the pageant of royalty which [sic] his father assumed, and that there will be undue delay in our becoming slaves of the despot to whose son-in-law our armies have been bequeathed as though they were his patrimony?" Miles views it probable that although Livy undoubtedly created the words of the speech, the sentiments behind them are genuine.

Second Punic War

Siege of Saguntum

The origins of the Second Punic War are accounted for differently by the various sources, with Polybius, one of the most contemporary and reliable sources, differing from a Roman historical tradition made up of Livy, Silius Italicus, Appian, Cassius Dio, and Zonaras. Within this Roman historical tradition, each of the sources diverges from the other in detail. Historian John Rich comments that while the historical tradition is weak in terms of chronology, such as commonly dating the Siege of Saguntum to the beginning of the Second Punic War, rather than preceding it, they do take care to mention internal debate in both Rome and Carthage related to the war, which Polybius intentionally minimized.

Some time within six years after the Ebro Treaty was signed between Rome and Carthage, the Roman Republic signed a separate agreement with the city of Saguntum, which was south of the Ebro. In 219 BC a Carthaginian army under Hannibal besieged Saguntum. Polybius states that the attack on Saguntum was preempted by a Roman embassy warning first Hannibal himself against taking action and then another to the Carthaginian senate to warn against an attack, both of which Hannibal ignored. In comparison, the Roman historical tradition holds that an embassy was sent in protest after the siege had already begun, with some, such as Livy, seemingly presenting two embassies, one before and one during. This attack and the following refusal of the Carthaginian senate to accede to Roman demands led the Romans to declare war in spring 218 BC, sparking the Second Punic War. According to Livy, after Hannibal had begun the attack, the Carthaginians sent envoys claiming they had not broken their treaty, as he was not acting on their orders, and did not have the support of the senate or the people. Another delegation that was sent to Rome after the Battle of Zama, which marked the end of the Second Punic War, is said to have repeated this, led by Hasdrubal the Kid. The tradition dates back to contemporary Roman annalist Fabius Pictor, suggesting it may be true, although Polybius himself argues that it is absurd to imagine that the Carthaginians did not actually support him. Polybius comments that there was no hesitancy on the part of the senate in giving Hannibal leeway in dealing with Saguntum, nor when they agreed to the final peace terms with Rome that ended the war.

Outbreak of war

During the time of the siege of Saguntum, there was a possibly legendary debate in the Carthaginian Senate over a Roman ultimatum. According to the account of Livy, Hanno, a leading opponent of Hannibal, argued before the senate during the time of Rome's first embassy, before the siege of Sarguntum began, that Rome's ultimatum must be accepted, and Hannibal and his subordinates should surrender to Rome. According to Livy, there was no response proffered by the senate, as they were aligned to Hannibal during this period. The poet Silius Italicus, in his Punica, however, not only moves the speech from the Roman first embassy to a possibly legendary second embassy, placed on the eve of the war, but also states that a senator named Gestar responded to him. The chronology of the events is however in question, as Polybius only mentions a single Roman embassy in winter 220/219, before Hannibal's attack on Saguntum. In contrast, Livy attributes the ultimatum to a seemingly second Roman embassy in 219, during the siege itself. Lazenby argues that this tale of a second embassy may be a move by Roman apologists to defend the inaction of the Roman Senate during the siege of Saguntum and that it is unlikely that Polybius would fail to mention this second embassy. He comments that given the doubtful nature of the second embassy, although Livy himself admits to the tangled nature of his chronology, the debate might be discarded as legendary.

According to the scene presented by Livy, during the second embassy, a speech was given by an unidentified senator, who alludes to the common areas of dispute between Carthage and Rome, such as the status of Saguntum, and the Ebro Treaty, negotiated by Hasdrubal. According to Lazenby, the senate denied the validity of the Ebro Treaty on the grounds that it had not been signed in Carthage, which he views as a pretext for the real dispute that the treaty gave Rome the implicit right to interfere in Iberia. Following this speech, the Roman envoys formally inquired if the Carthaginian Senate would repudiate the actions of Hannibal, and a spokesperson attempted to justify the situation, only to be ignored by the Romans. The leader of the Roman envoy, consul Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus then gestured to the fold of his toga, declaring that it held both peace and war and that he might let it fall wherever he chose. The presiding sufete bade him let it fall, and as Fabius let it fall to war, the assembled senate declared "We accept it!" Polybius' narrative of a the outbreak of war is somewhat similar, although it contains no such speech. Rather, the Carthaginians are angered by the Roman embassy, and discuss the contents of earlier treaties, before negotiations break down; thereon the story contains the same details of the Roman ambassador dropping his toga to a side, while the Carthaginians accept war.

Joannes Zonaras gives another version of events, in which a man named Hasdrubal, who had been prepared by Hannibal, gives a passionate speech in favor of war, arguing that “if you permit Hannibal on his own to act as he wishes, what is needed will be done without your taking any trouble”. Hanno responded to this, arguing that Carthage should not take war lightly, nor enter it over minor grievances when they could deal with such matters or pass on responsibility to those more directly involved. According to Zonaras, the older Carthaginians, who had witnessed the First Punic War, sided with Hanno, but the younger men, especially those aligned with Hannibal, favored war. From thence, the narrative of both Zonaras, and the fragmentary records of Cassius Dio he bases his work upon, continues with the narrative of the toga being dropped unto war.

Silius Italicus gives the debate of Hanno and Gestar as occurring at this point, during the second embassy, which historian Bruce Gibson comments is done in order to compare the debate to that of Turnus and Drances in the Aeneid, wherein the enemies of Aeneas and the Trojans dispute the continuation of the war, but the historicity of the account bears investigation. According to Silius, Hanno begins by arguing that Hannibal endangers Carthage, and speaks of the Carthaginian defeat in the Battle of the Aegates during the First Punic War, something shared by Livy, before giving a prediction that they will be defeated in Italy, which is absent from Livy's narrative. Gestar then responds by calling Hanno a traitor and arguing with both his comparison to the past and prophesy of the future. While briefly entertaining the possibility of defeat, delivered as a result of the gods opposing them, Gestar argues this would be better than the disgrace of surrender to the Romans. Gibson comments that the speech is plausible in that it is reasonable to assume some in Carthage would oppose the war, given the weak position they were in; after all, the end of the Mercenary War had seem them bow to Roman demands and surrender Sardinia. Given this, and the fact that Silius provides a balanced pair of speeches, Gibson argues that Silius' speeches improve upon the other historical materials. He further notes that Silius lends a greater degree of hesitancy to the Carthaginians than Polybius, stating that although Hanno was a lone voice in dissent, he interrupted the commencement of a vote to argue further, something that shocked the other senators. According to Silius, the Carthaginian senate ultimately refuses to provide an answer, whereafter the Roman declare war.

Conduct during war

After the battle of Canae, Livy tells a story that Hannibal's brother, Mago, poured out the rings of the senators and equities slain in the battle upon the floor of the Carthaginian Senate. This would include Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, Marcus Minucius Rufus (according to Livy), both of the consuls' quaestors, 29 of the 48 military tribunes, and 80 men who were senators or expected to become such.

In spite of opposition, Mago managed to have the senate approve a relief force for Hannibal in Italy in 215, however, men were not immediately available, and thus he was sent to Spain to arrange them.

Gaius Laelius launched a raid against Africa, which sent the senate into a panic, after which they approved emergency funds to raise a local army, and hire mercenaries from nearby African countryside.

Hannibal needed to secure support from the Carthaginian senate to ensure military success, relying not only on shipments of men and funds from the capital but also on the legitimacy they would bring him. As Hannibal sought to sway uncertain Roman allies, especially the Punic communities of Sicily and Sardinia, he would need to be seen as a legitimate representative of Carthage, rather than a rogue general. Indeed, the senate had representatives, called synedroicode: ell promoted to code: el in Greek, that accompanied the Carthaginian army in Spain and Italy. Those representatives would co-sign the treaty that Hannibal made with Philip V of Macedon in 215, which would cause the First Macedonian War between Macedonia and Rome soon after.

Negotiation and surrender

After Battle of Utica (203 BC)

After the Battle of Utica, the Carthaginian felt it had no option but to recall Hannibal from Italy. They made a play for time while awaiting his arrival, sending a thirty man delegation to Scipio with the orders to dicuss terms.

They began

Third Punic War

While the Carthaginians had surrendered a number of important men as hostages, and a large amount of military equipment, after the end of the Second Punic War, the refusal of the Carthaginian senate to accede to further demands led to the outbreak of the Third Punic War. After Carthage unsuccessfully invaded the Roman client king Masinissa of Numidia, the Romans demanded that the city of Carthage be abandoned, and moved further inland, in order to remove any trace of Carthaginian naval power. The senate refused, preferring to fight rather than see their capital destroyed; after a difficult war, the city was besieged and captured by Scipio, and ultimately razed.

To consult

• Hannibal's Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western ..., Issue 2005 (Hoyos)
• Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War (2015) (Hoyos)
• Lazenby, John F. (1998). Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second Punic War. University of Oklahoma Press.

Primary sources

• Aristotle, Politics
• Appian, The Foreign Wars
• Cassius Dio, History of Rome
• Flavius Josephus, The Jewish War
• Joannes Zonaras, Extracts of History
• Livy, Ab urbe condita
• Polybius, The Histories
• Silius Italicus, Punica

Sources

• Abulafia, David (2011). The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-532334-4.
• Bagnall, Nigel (1999). The Punic Wars: Rome, Carthage and the Struggle for the Mediterranean. London: Pimlico. ISBN 978-0-7126-6608-4.
• Collins, Roger (1998). Spain: An Oxford Archaeological Guide. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-285300-4.
• Eckstein, Arthur (2006). Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24618-8.
• Gabriel, Richard A. (2008). Scipio Africanus: Rome's Greatest General. Potomac Books. ISBN 9781597972055.
• Gibson, Bruce (2010). Brill's Companion to Silius Italicus. Brill. ISBN 9789004217119.
• Goldsworthy, Adrian (2006). The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265–146 BC. London: Phoenix. ISBN 978-0-304-36642-2.
• Hoyos, B. D. (2005). Hannibal's Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247-183 BC. Routledge. ISBN 9780415359580.
• Hoyos, B. D. (2007). Carthage’s fight for survival, 241 to 237 BC. Brill. ISBN 9789047421924.
• Lazenby, John F. (1998). Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second Punic War. University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 9780806130040.
• Mason, S. (2008). Flavius Josephus: Translation and Commentary. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 9789047442219.
• Miles, Richard (2011). Carthage Must be Destroyed. London: Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-101809-6.
• Rawlings, Louis (2010). "The Carthaginian Navy: Questions And Assumptions". In Trundle, Matthew; Fagan, Garrett (eds.). New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare. Brill. ISBN 9789004187344.
• Rich, John (2018). "Speech in Cassius Dio's Roman History, Books 1–35". In Burden-Strevens, Christopher (ed.). Cassius Dio’s Forgotten History of Early Rome. Brill. ISBN 9789004384552.
• Scullard, H. H. (1970). "Carthage and Rome". The Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. VII, Part II. Cambridge. ISBN 9780521234467.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)